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Abstract
Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the wireless transmission can be readily over-
heard by unauthorized users for interception purposes and is thus highly vulnerable to eavesdropping
attacks. To this end, physical-layer security is emerging as a promising paradigm to protect the wireless
communications against eavesdropping attacks by exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless
channels. This article is focused on the investigation of diversity techniques to improve the physical-
layer security, differing from the conventional artificial noise generation and beamforming techniques
which typically consume additional power for generating artificial noise and exhibit high implementation
complexity for beamformer design. We present several diversity approaches to improve the wireless
physical-layer security, including the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), multiuser diversity, and
cooperative diversity. To illustrate the security improvement through diversity, we propose a case study of
exploiting cooperative relays to assist the signal transmission from source to destination while defending
against eavesdropping attacks. We evaluate the security performance of cooperative relay transmission
in Rayleigh fading environments in terms of secrecy capacity and intercept probability. It is shown that
as the number of relays increases, the secrecy capacity and intercept probability of the cooperative relay
transmission both improve significantly, implying the advantage of exploiting cooperative diversity to
improve the physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks, the transmission between legitimate users can be easily overheard by an
eavesdropper for interception due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium, making the wireless
transmission highly vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. In order to achieve the confidential
transmission, existing communications systems typically adopt the cryptographic techniques to
prevent an eavesdropper from tapping the data transmission between legitimate users [1], [2].
By considering the symmetric key encryption as an example, the original data (called plaintext)
is first encrypted at source node by using an encryption algorithm along with a secret key that
is shared with destination node only. Then, the encrypted plaintext (also known as ciphertext) is
transmitted to destination that will decrypt its received ciphertext with the pre-shared secret key.
In this way, even if an eavesdropper overhears the ciphertext transmission, it is still difficult to
interpret the plaintext by the eavesdropper from its intercepted ciphertext without the secret key.
It is pointed out that the ciphertext transmission is not perfectly secure, since the ciphertext can
still be decrypted by an eavesdropper with the exhaustive key search, which is also known as the
brute-force attack. To this end, physical-layer security is emerging as an alternative paradigm
to protect the wireless communications against eavesdropping attacks, including the brute-force
attack.
Physical-layer security work was pioneered by Wyner in [3], where a discrete memoryless
wiretap channel was examined for secure communications in the presence of an eavesdropper.
It was proved in [3] that the perfectly secure data transmission can be achieved if the channel
capacity of the main link (from source to destination) is higher than that of the wiretap link
(from source to eavesdropper). Later on, in [4], the Wyner’s results were extended from the
discrete memoryless wiretap channel to the Gaussian wiretap channel, where a so-called secrecy
capacity was developed and shown as the difference between the channel capacity of the main
link and that of the wiretap link. If the secrecy capacity falls below zero, the transmission from
source to destination becomes insecure and the eavesdropper would succeed in intercepting the
source transmission, i.e., an intercept event occurs. In order to improve the transmission security
against eavesdropping attacks, it is of importance to reduce the probability of occurrence of an
intercept event (called intercept probability) through enlarging the secrecy capacity. However, in
wireless communications, the secrecy capacity severely degrades due to the fading effect.
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3As a consequence, there are extensive works aimed at increasing the secrecy capacity of
wireless communications by exploiting the multiple antennas [5] and cooperative relays [6].
Specifically, the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel was studied in [7] to
enhance the wireless secrecy capacity in fading environments. In [8], the cooperative relays were
examined for improving the physical-layer security in terms of the secrecy rate performance. A
hybrid cooperative beamforming and jamming approach was investigated in [9] to enhance the
wireless secrecy capacity, where partial relay nodes are allowed to assist the source transmission
to the legitimate destination with the aid of distributed beamforming, while the remaining relay
nodes are used to transmit artificial noise for confusing the eavesdropper. More recently, a joint
physical-application layer security framework was proposed in [10] for improving the security of
wireless multimedia delivery by simultaneously exploiting the physical-layer signal processing
techniques as well as the upper-layer authentication and watermarking methods. In [11], the error-
control coding for secrecy was discussed for achieving the physical-layer security. Additionally,
in [12] and [13], the physical-layer security was further investigated in emerging cognitive radio
networks.
At the time of writing, most research efforts are devoted to examining the artificial noise
and beamforming techniques to combat the eavesdropping attacks, which, however, consume
additional power resources for generating artificial noise and increase the computational com-
plexity for performing beamformer design. Therefore, this paper is motivated to enhance the
physical-layer security through diversity techniques without additional power costs, including
the MIMO, multiuser diversity, and cooperative diversity, aiming at increasing the capacity of
the main channel while degrading the wiretap channel. For illustration purposes, we present
a case study of exploiting cooperative relays to improve the physical-layer security against
eavesdropping attacks, where the best relay is selected and used to participate in forwarding the
signal transmission from source to destination. We evaluate the secrecy capacity and intercept
probability of proposed cooperative relay transmission in Rayleigh fading environments. It is
shown that upon increasing number of relays, the security performance of cooperative relay
transmission significantly improves in terms of the secrecy capacity and intercept probability.
This confirms the advantage of using cooperative relays to protect the wireless communications
against eavesdropping attacks.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model of
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Fig. 1. A wireless communications scenario consisting of one source and one destination in the presence of an eavesdropping
attack.
physical-layer security in wireless communications. Next, in Section III, we are focused on the
physical-layer security enhancement through diversity techniques, including the MIMO, multiuser
diversity, and cooperative diversity. For the purpose of illustrating the security improvement
through diversity, Section IV presents a case study of exploiting cooperative relays to assist the
signal transmission from source to destination against eavesdropping attacks. Finally, we provide
some concluding remarks in Section V.
II. PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY IN WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
Fig. 1 shows a wireless communications scenario with one source and one destination in
the presence of an eavesdropper, where the solid and dash lines represent the main channel
(from source to destination) and the wiretap channel (from source to eavesdropper), respectively.
When the source node transmits its signal to destination, an eavesdropper may overhear such
transmission due to the broadcast nature of wireless medium. Considering the fact that today’s
wireless systems are highly standardized, the eavesdropper can readily obtain the transmission
parameters, including the signal waveform, coding and modulation scheme, encryption algorithm,
and so on. Also, the secret key may be figured out at the eavesdropper e.g. through the exhaustive
search. Thus, the source signal could be interpreted at the eavesdropper by decoding its overheard
signal, leading the legitimate transmission to be insecure.
As a result, physical-layer security emerges as an alternative means to achieve the perfect
transmission secrecy from source to destination. In the physical-layer security literature [3]
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5and [4], a so-called “secrecy capacity” is developed and shown as the difference between the
capacities of main link and wiretap link. It has been proven that perfect secrecy is achieved if
the secrecy capacity is positive, meaning that when the main channel capacity is larger than the
wiretap channel capacity, the transmission from source to destination can be perfectly secure.
This can be explained by using the Shannon coding theorem from which a receiver is impossible
to recover the source signal if the channel capacity (from source to the receiver) is smaller than
the data rate. Thus, given a positive secrecy capacity, the data rate can be adjusted between the
capacities of main and wiretap channels so that the destination node successfully decodes the
source signal and the eavesdropper fails to decode. However, if the secrecy capacity is negative
(i.e., the main channel capacity falls below the wiretap channel capacity), the eavesdropper is
more likely than the destination to succeed in decoding the source signal. In an information-
theoretic sense, when the main channel capacity becomes smaller than the wiretap channel
capacity, it is impossible to guarantee that the destination succeeds and the eavesdropper fails
to decode the source signal. Therefore, an intercept event is viewed to occur when the secrecy
capacity falls below zero, and the probability of occurrence of intercept event is called intercept
probability throughout this article.
At present, most existing work is focused on improving the physical-layer security by generat-
ing artificial noise to confuse the eavesdropping attack, where the artificial noise is sophisticatedly
produced such that only the eavesdropper is interfered and the desired destination can easily
cancel out such noise without performance degradation. More specifically, given a main channel
matrix Hm, the artificial noise (denoted by wn) is designed in the null space of matrix Hm
such that Hmwn = 0, making the desired destination unaffected by the noise. Since the wiretap
channel is independent of the main channel, the null space of wiretap channel is in general
different from that of main channel and thus the eavesdropper can not null out the artificial
noise, which results in the performance degradation at the eavesdropper. Notice that the above-
mentioned null space based noise generation approach needs the knowledge of main channel
Hm only, which can be further optimized if the wiretap channel information is also known. It
needs to be pointed out that additional power resources are required for generating artificial
noise to confuse the eavesdropper. For a fair comparison, the total transmit power of artificial
noise and desired signal should be constrained. Also, the power allocation between the artificial
noise and desired signal is important and should be adapted to the main and wiretap channels
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6to optimize the physical-layer security performance e.g. in terms of secrecy capacity. Differing
from the artificial noise generation approach, this article is mainly focused on the investigation
of diversity techniques for enhancing the physical-layer security.
III. DIVERSITY FOR PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY
In this section, we present several diversity techniques to improve the physical-layer security
against eavesdropping attacks. Traditionally, diversity techniques are exploited to increase the
transmission reliability, which also have great potential to enhance the wireless security. In the
following, we will discuss the physical-layer security improvement through the use of MIMO,
multiuser diversity, and cooperative diversity, respectively. Notice that the MIMO and multiuser
diversity mechanisms are generally applicable to various cellular and Wi-Fi networks, since the
cellular and Wi-Fi networks typically consist of multiple users and, moreover, today’s cellular
and Wi-Fi devices are equipped with multiple antennas. In contrast, the cooperative diversity
mechanism is only applicable to some advanced cellular and Wi-Fi networks that have adopted
the relay architecture e.g. the long term evolution (LTE)-advanced system and IEEE 802.16j/m,
where relay stations are introduced to assist the wireless data transmission.
A. MIMO Diversity
This subsection presents MIMO diversity for physical-layer security of wireless transmission
against eavesdropping attacks. As shown in Fig. 2, all the network nodes are equipped with
multiple antennas, where M , Nd and Ne represent the number of antennas at source, destination
and eavesdropper, respectively. As is known, MIMO has been shown as an effective means to
combat wireless fading and increase the capacity of wireless channel. However, the eavesdropper
can also exploit the MIMO structure to enlarge the capacity of wiretap channel from source to
eavesdropper. Thus, without a proper design, it may fail to increase the secrecy capacity of
wireless transmission with MIMO. For example, if the conventional open-loop space-time block
coding is considered, the destination should first estimate the main channel matrix Hm and then
perform the space-time decoding process with an estimated Hˆm, leading the diversity gain to be
achieved for the main channel. Similarly, the eavesdropper can also estimate the wiretap channel
matrix Hw and then conduct the corresponding space-time decoding algorithm to obtain diversity
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Fig. 2. A multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless system consisting of one source and one destination in the presence
of an eavesdropping attack.
gain for the wiretap channel. Hence, the conventional space-time block coding is not effective
to improve the physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks.
Generally speaking, if the source node transmits its signal to the desired destination with M
antennas, the eavesdropper will also receive M signal copies for interception purposes. In order
to defend against eavesdropping attacks, the source node should adopt a preprocess that needs
to be adapted to the main and wiretap channels Hm and Hw such that the diversity gain can
be achieved at destination only whereas the eavesdropper benefits nothing from the multiple
transmit antennas at source. This means that an adaptive transmit process should be included
at the source node to increase the main channel capacity while decreasing the wiretap channel
capacity. Ideally, the objective of such adaptive transmit process is to maximize the secrecy
capacity of MIMO transmission, which, however, requires the channel state information (CSI)
of both main and wiretap links (i.e., Hm and Hw). In practice, the wiretap channel information
Hw may be unavailable, since the eavesdropper is usually passive and keeps silent. If only
the main channel information Hm is known, the adaptive transmit process can be designed to
maximize the main channel capacity, which does not require the knowledge of wiretap channel
Hw. Since the adaptive transmit process is optimized based on the main channel information Hm
May 16, 2014 DRAFT
8and the wiretap channel is typically independent of the main channel, the main channel capacity
will be significantly increased with MIMO and no improvement will be achieved for the wiretap
channel capacity.
As for the aforementioned adaptive transmit process, we here present three main concrete
approaches: transmit beamforming, power allocation, and transmit antenna selection. The transmit
beamforming is a signal processing technique by combining multiple transmit antennas at the
source node in such a way that desired signals transmit in a particular direction to destination.
Considering that the eavesdropper and destination generally lie in different directions relative
to the source node, the desired signals (with transmit beamforming) that are received at the
eavesdropper will experience destructive interference and become very weak. Thus, the transmit
beamforming is effective to defend against eavesdropping attacks when the destination and eaves-
dropper are spatially separated. The power allocation is to maximize the main channel capacity
(or secrecy capacity if both Hm and Hw are known) by allocating the transmit power among M
antennas at source. In this way, the secrecy capacity of MIMO transmission will be significantly
increased, showing the security benefits of using power allocation against eavesdropping attacks.
In addition, the transmit antenna selection is also able to improve the physical-layer security of
MIMO wireless systems. Depending on whether the global CSI of main and wiretap channels
(i.e., Hm and Hw) is available, an optimal transmit antenna at the source node will be selected
and used to transmit source signals. More specifically, if both Hm and Hw are available, a
transmit antenna with the highest secrecy capacity will be chosen. Studying the case of the global
CSI available will provide a theoretical upper bound on the security performance of wireless
systems. Notice that the CSI of wiretap channels may be estimated and obtained by monitoring
the eavesdroppers’ transmissions as discussed in [8] and [14]. If only Hm is known, the transmit
antenna selection is to maximize the main channel capacity. One can observe that the above-
mentioned three approaches (i.e., transmit beamforming, power allocation, and transmit antenna
selection) all have great potential to improve the physical-layer security of MIMO wireless
systems against eavesdropping attacks.
B. Multiuser Diversity
This subsection discusses the multiuser diversity for improving physical-layer security. Fig.
3 shows that a base station (BS) serves multiple users where M users are denoted by U =
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Fig. 3. A multiuser wireless communications system consisting of one base station (BS) and multiple users in the presence of
an eavesdropper.
{Ui|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M}. In cellular networks, M users typically communicate with BS with an
orthogonal multiple access mechanism such as the orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) and time division multiple access (TDMA). Taking the OFDMA as an example, the
OFDM subcarriers are allocated to different users. In other words, given an OFDM subcarrier,
we need to determine which user should be assigned to access and use the subcarrier for data
transmission. Traditionally, a user with the highest throughput is selected to access the given
OFDM subcarrier, aiming at maximizing the transmission capacity. This relies on the knowledge
of main channel information Hm only and can provide the significant multiuser diversity gain
for performance improvement. However, if a user is far away from BS and experiences severe
propagation loss and deep fading, it may have no chance to be selected as the “best” user
for channel access. To this end, user fairness should be further considered in the multiuser
scheduling, where two competing interests need to be balanced: maximizing the main channel
capacity while at the same time guaranteeing each user with certain opportunities to access the
channel.
With the multiuser scheduling, a user is first selected to access a channel (i.e., an OFDM
subcarrier in OFDMA or a time slot in TDMA) and then starts transmitting its signal to BS.
Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, the eavesdropper overhears such
transmission and attempts to interpret the source signal. In order to effectively defend against
the eavesdropping attack, the multiuser scheduling should be performed to minimize the wiretap
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Fig. 4. A cooperative diversity system consisting of one source, M relays, and one destination in the presence of an eavesdropper.
channel capacity while maximizing the main channel capacity, which requires the CSI of both
main and wiretap links. If only the main channel information Hm is available, we may consider
the use of conventional multiuser scheduling where the wiretap channel information Hw is not
taken into account. It needs to be pointed out the conventional multiuser scheduling still has great
potential to enhance the physical-layer security, since the main channel capacity is significantly
improved with conventional multiuser scheduling while the wiretap channel capacity remains
the same.
C. Cooperative Diversity
In this subsection, we are mainly focused on the cooperative diversity for wireless security
against eavesdropping attacks. Fig. 4 shows a cooperative wireless network including one source,
M relays, and one destination in the presence of an eavesdropper, where M relays are exploited
to assist the signal transmission from source to destination. To be specific, the source node first
transmits its signal to M relays that then forward their received source signals to destination. At
present, there are two basic relay protocols: amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward
(DF). In the AF protocol, a relay node simply amplifies and retransmits its received noisy
version of the source signal to the destination. In contrast, the DF protocol requires the relay
node to decode its received signal and forward its decoded outcome to the destination node. It is
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concluded that the multiple relays assisted source signal transmission consists of two steps: 1)
the source node broadcasts its signal, and 2) relay nodes retransmit their received signals. Each
of the two transmission steps is vulnerable to eavesdropping attack and needs to be carefully
designed to prevent an eavesdropper from intercepting the source signal.
Typically, the main channel capacity with multiple relays can be significantly increased by
using cooperative beamforming. More specifically, multiple relays can form a virtual antenna
array and cooperate with each other to perform transmit beamforming such that the signals re-
ceived at the intended destination experience constructive interference while the others (received
at eavesdropper) experience destructive interference. One can observe that with the cooperative
beamforming, the received signal strength of destination will be much higher than that of eaves-
dropper, implying the physical-layer security improvement. In addition to the aforementioned
cooperative beamforming, the best relay selection is another approach to improve the wireless
transmission security against eavesdropping attacks. In the best relay selection, a relay node
with the highest secrecy capacity (or highest main channel capacity if only the main channel
information is available) is chosen to participate in assisting the signal transmission from source
to destination. In this way, the cooperative diversity gain will be achieved for the physical-layer
security enhancement.
IV. CASE STUDY: SECURITY EVALUATION OF COOPERATIVE RELAY TRANSMISSION
In this section, we present a case study to show the physical-layer security improvement
by exploiting cooperative relays, where only a single best relay will be selected to assist the
signal transmission from source to destination. This differs from existing research efforts in [8],
where multiple cooperative relays participate in forwarding the source signal to destination. For
the comparison purpose, we first consider the conventional direct transmission as a benchmark
scheme, where the source node directly transmits its signal to destination without relay. Mean-
while, an eavesdropper is present and attempts to intercept the signal transmission from source to
destination. As discussed in [3] and [4], the secrecy capacity of conventional direct transmission
is shown as the difference between the capacities of main channel (from source to destination)
and wiretap channel (from source to eavesdropper), which is written as
Cs = log2
(
1 +
P |hsd|
2
N0
)
− log2
(
1 +
P |hse|
2
N0
)
, (1)
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where P is the transmit power at source, N0 is the variance of additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN), γs = P/N0 is regarded to as the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and hsd and hse represent
fading coefficients of the channel from source to destination and that from source to eavesdropper,
respectively. Presently, there are three commonly used fading models (i.e., Rayleigh, Rician and
Nakagami) and we consider the use of Rayleigh fading model to characterize the main and
wiretap channels. Thus, |hsd|2 and |hse|2 are independent and exponentially distributed random
variables with means σ2sd and σ2se, respectively. Also, an ergodic secrecy capacity of the direct
transmission can be obtained by averaging the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs+ over the
fading coefficients hsd and hse, where C+s = max (Cs, 0). In addition, if the secrecy capacity Cs
falls below zero, the source transmission becomes insecure and the eavesdropper will succeed
in intercepting the source signal. Thus, using Eq. (1) and denoting x = |hsd|2 and y = |hse|2, an
intercept probability of the direct transmission can be given by
Pintercept = Pr (Cs < 0)
= Pr
(
|hsd|
2 < |hse|
2
)
=
∫∫
x<y
1
σ2sdσ
2
se
exp(−
x
σ2sd
−
y
σ2se
)dxdy
=
σ2se
σ2sd + σ
2
se
,
(2)
where the third equation arises from the fact that random variables |hsd|2 and |hse|2 are inde-
pendent exponentially distributed, and σ2sd and σ2se are the expected values of |hsd|2 and |hse|2,
respectively. As can be observed from Eq. (2), the intercept probability of conventional direct
transmission is independent of the transmit power P , meaning that increasing the transmit power
cannot improve the physical-layer security in terms of intercept probability. This motivates us
to explore the use of cooperative relays to decrease the intercept probability. For notational
convenience, let λme represent the ratio of average main channel gain σ2sd to eavesdropper’s
average channel gain σ2se, i.e., λme = σ2sd/σ2se, which is referred to as the main-to-eavesdropper
ratio (MER) throughout this article. In the following, we present the cooperative relay trans-
mission scheme where multiple relays are used to assist the signal transmission from source to
destination. Here, the AF relaying protocol is considered and only the best relay will be selected
to participate in forwarding the source signal to destination. To be specific, the source node
first broadcasts its signal to M relays. Then, the best relay node will be chosen to forward a
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scaled version of its received signal to destination [15]. Notice that during the above-mentioned
cooperative relay transmission process, the total amount of transmit power at source and relay
should be constrained to P to make a fair comparison with the conventional direct transmission
scheme. We here consider the equal-power allocation and thus the transmit power at source and
relay is given by P/2.
Now, given M relays, it is crucial to determine which relay should be selected as the best one
to assist the source signal transmission. Ideally, the best relay selection should aim to maximize
the secrecy capacity, which, however, requires the CSI of both main and wiretap channels. Since
the eavesdropper is passive and the wiretap channel information is difficult to obtain in practice,
we consider the main channel capacity as the objective of best relay selection, which relies on
the knowledge of main channel only. Accordingly, the best relay selection criterion with AF
protocol is expressed as
Best Relay = argmax
i∈R
|hsi|
2|hid|
2
|hsi|2 + |hid|2
, (3)
where R denotes a set of M relays, and |hsi|2 and |hid|2 represent fading coefficients of the
channel from source to relay Ri and that from relay Ri to destination, respectively. One can
see from Eq. (3) that the proposed best relay selection criterion only requires the main channel
information |hsi|2 and |hid|2, with which the main channel capacity is maximized. Since the main
and wiretap channels are independent of each other, the wiretap channel capacity will benefit
nothing from the proposed best relay selection. Similar to Eq. (1), the secrecy capacity of best
relay selection scheme can be obtained through subtracting the main channel capacity by the
corresponding wiretap channel capacity. Also, the intercept probability of best relay selection
is easily determined by computing the probability that the secrecy capacity becomes less than
zero.
In Fig. 5, we provide the ergodic secrecy capacity comparison between the conventional direct
transmission and proposed best relay selection schemes for different number of relays M with
γs = 12dB, σ2sd = 0.5, and σ2sr = σ2rd = 2. It is shown from Fig. 5 that for the cases of
M = 2, M = 4 and M = 8, the ergodic secrecy capacity of best relay selection scheme is
always higher than that of direct transmission, showing the wireless security benefits of using
cooperative relays. Also, as the number of relays M increases from M = 2 to M = 8, the
ergodic secrecy capacity of best relay selection scheme significantly increases. This means that
May 16, 2014 DRAFT
14
−5 0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Main−to−Eavesdropper Ratio (dB)
Er
go
di
c 
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
ts/
s/H
z)
 
 
Relay selection w. M = 8
Relay selection  w. M = 4
Relay selection  w. M = 2
Direct transmisson
Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy capacity versus MER of the direct transmission and best relay selection schemes with γs = 12dB,
σ2sd = 0.5, and σ2sr = σ2rd = 2.
increasing the number of cooperative relays can improve the physical-layer security of wireless
transmission against eavesdropping attacks.
Fig. 6 shows the intercept probability versus MER of the conventional direct transmission
and proposed best relay selection schemes for different number of relays M with γs = 12dB,
σ2sd = 0.5, and σ2sr = σ2rd = 2. Notice that the intercept probability is obtained by calculating the
rate of occurrence of an intercept event that the capacity of the main channel falls below that of
the wiretap channel. Observe from Fig. 6 that the best relay selection scheme outperforms the
conventional direct transmission in terms of intercept probability. Moreover, as the number of
cooperative relays M increases from M = 2 to M = 8, the intercept probability improvement
of best relay selection over direct transmission becomes much more significant. It is also shown
from Fig. 6 that the slope of the intercept probability curve of best relay selection scheme in
high MER regions becomes steeper with an increasing number of relays. In other words, as the
number of relays increases, the intercept probability of best relay selection scheme decreases
at much higher speed with an increasing MER. This further confirms that the diversity gain is
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achieved by the proposed relay selection scheme for the physical-layer security improvement.
V. CONCLUSION
This article studied the physical-layer security of wireless communications and presented
several diversity techniques for improving the wireless security against eavesdropping attacks. We
discussed the use of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), multiuser diversity, and cooperative
diversity for the sake of increasing the secrecy capacity of wireless transmission. To illustrate
the security benefits through diversity, we proposed a case study of the physical-layer security
in cooperative wireless networks with multiple relays, where the best relay was selected to
participate in forwarding the signal transmission from source to destination. The secrecy capacity
and intercept probability of the conventional direct transmission and the proposed best relay
selection schemes were evaluated in Rayleigh fading environments. It was shown that the best
relay selection scheme outperforms the direct transmission in terms of both the secrecy capacity
and intercept probability. Moreover, as the number of cooperative relays increases, the security
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improvement of the best relay selection scheme over direct transmission becomes much more
significant.
Although extensive research efforts have been devoted to the wireless physical-layer security,
many challenging but interesting issues still remain open for future work. Specifically, most of
the existing works in this subject are focused on enhancing the wireless secrecy capacity against
the eavesdropping attack only, but have neglected the joint consideration of different types of
the wireless physical-layer attacks, including both the eavesdropping and denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks. It will be of high importance to explore new techniques of jointly defending against
multiple different wireless attacks. Furthermore, the security, reliability and throughput are the
main driving factors for the research and development of next-generation wireless networks,
which are typically coupled and affect each other. For example, the security of wireless physical
layer may be improved by generating the artificial noise for confusing the eavesdropping attack,
which, however, comes at the expense of degrading the wireless reliability and throughput
performance, since the artificial noise generation consumes some power resources and less
transmit power becomes available for the desired information transmission. Thus, it will be
of interest to investigate the joint optimization of security, reliability and throughput for the
wireless physical layer, which is a challenging issue to be solved in the future.
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